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ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT LACKS SUBJECT-MATTER 
JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFFS' 
FAILED TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE 
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
The plaintiffs, Donald T. and Rita Wills ("the Wills"), rely on two arguments to 
support their contention that they complied with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
("Immunity Act") sufficiently to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the trial court. 
First, they strictly complied with the requirements of the Immunity Act because Attorney 
General Mark L. Shurtleff has an office within the Heber Wells Building, and second, 
even if they did not strictly comply, they substantially complied with the Immunity Act by 
mailing a notice of claim to the Heber Wells Building. Both arguments fail. 
A. Substantial Compliance Is Insufficient to 
Confer Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. 
The Wills argue the defendant Heber Valley Historic Railroad Authority ("the 
Railroad") must be estopped from raising a jurisdictional defense of failing to comply 
with the Immunity Act because they have substantially complied with it.1 This would 
require the Court to depart from its well-established line of precedential cases which 
mandate strict compliance with the Immunity Act, and to accept that substantial 
compliance with the Immunity Act is sufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon 
1
 Challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and cannot be 
waived by the parties. Barnard v. Wassermann. 855 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1993). 
3 
the trial court. This Court has consistently held that strict compliance with the Immunity 
Act is a jurisdictional precondition to suit. Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 977 P.2d 1201, 
1203 (Utah 1999); see Scarborough v. Granite Sch. Dist. 531 P.2d 480,482 (Utah 1972) 
("[w]e have consistently held that where a cause of action is based upon a statute, full 
compliance with its requirements is a condition precedent to the right to maintain a 
suit."). 
The Wills argue that they have substantially complied with the Immunity Act 
because Attorney General Mark L. Shurtleff maintains an office at the Heber Wells 
Building, and service of a notice of claim upon a unnamed division within his office of 
over 150 assistant attorneys general satisfies the notice provision. In fact, Attorney 
General Mark L. Shurtleff does not maintain an office within that building, nor at that 
address. Attorney General Shurtleff has but one physical business address and that is 236 
State Capitol. The Immunity Act requires, as a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit, that a 
claimant direct and deliver a notice of claim to the Attorney General. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-1 l(b)(ii)(E). Addressing a notice of claim to the Attorney General, but not 
delivering it to him, does not satisfy the Immunity Act's requirement. In Scarborough, 
this court stated, "In order to so meet the requirements of the statute . . . and fulfill its 
intended purpose . . . [the notice of claim must] be directed to and delivered to someone 
authorized to or responsible for receiving it " (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
Id. at 482. 
4 
Recently, this Court declined to adopt a substantial compliance interpretation of 
the Immunity Act's notice of claim requirement, "which would deem notices of claim 
legally sufficient under the Act in circumstances where the relevant governmental entity 
receives timely notice and 'the claimant substantially complies with [Act's] form and 
delivery requirements." Wheeler v. McPherson. 2002 UT 16,1f 8, 40 P.3d 632, 634.2 
Instead, the Wheeler Court quoted its decision in Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corr.« 2001 
UT 34, 24 P.3d 958 and stated, "[w]e have consistently and uniformly held that suit may 
not be brought against the state or its subdivisions unless the requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity Act are strictly followed." Hall 2001 UT 34, f 23 (emphasis 
added). The Court noted that the 1998 amendment to the notice of claim provision 
"clarified exactly to whom such notice must be delivered" and "only further bolstered the 
strict compliance standard...." Wheeler, 2002 UT 16, f 12. Actual notice of a claim by 
a governmental entity is insufficient to meet the requirements of the Immunity Act; the 
determining standard is compliance with the Act itself.3 Greene v. Utah Transit Auth.. 
2001 UT 1091J15, 37 P.3d 1156, 1159. The Wills's argument for the sufficiency of 
substantial compliance has been soundly, and consistently, rejected by this Court. 
2
 The Wills misstate that this Court affirmed estoppel as an appropriate argument 
to the jurisdictional defense of improper filing of a notice of claim. In fact, the Court 
rejected the estoppel argument advanced by the Wheeler plaintiffs. 
3
 The Wills state in their brief that the notice of claim was denied about 75 days 
after its mailing. (R. 50). Again, their citation to the record is incorrect, and there is no 
evidence that the notice of claim was ever received by the Attorney General. 
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In addition, the Wills argue that "attorney general" is not capitalized in Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(E)(l 9), and therefore, the individual himself need not be 
served. The argument is unfounded. None of the titles of the individuals identified in the 
applicable statute are capitalized, and yet there is only one person who holds that specific 
office or position. In Wheeler, the notice of claim was served upon the county 
commission and not the county clerk as required by the statute. This was insufficient to 
meet the requirements of the Immunity Act and the case was dismissed with prejudice. 
Id. 2002 UT 16, Tf 7. There is only one individual who is the attorney general, and the 
Immunity Act requires service of the notice of claim upon him. The language is explicit 
and absent any ambiguity, the Court will not look beyond the statute's plain language. 
State v. Vigil 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1992). 
B, Strict Compliance Is the Standard. 
Next, the Wills argue that they satisfied the Immunity Act's notice provision 
because Attorney General Mark L. Shurtleff maintains an office at the Heber Wells 
Building, and service of the notice of claim to that address was sufficient. They argue 
that the trial court found "that the evidence conclusively established that the attorney 
general has an office at the Heber Wells Building, even though he also has one in the 
State Capitol. (Appellee's Brief at 6).4 The trial court never made any such factual 
4
 The Wills citations to the record do not correspond to the statements contained in 
their Brief. 
6 
finding, and the Wills raise this argument for the first time on appeal (R. 73-75). "Under 
ordinary circumstances, appellate courts will not consider an issue . . . raised for the first 
time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error." State v. Helmick. 2000 UT 
70, U 8, 9 P.3d 164,167. This is an interlocutory appeal arising out of a Motion to 
Dismiss. The issue presented to the trial court was a question of law, and thus factual 
findings were never made and were unnecessary. But cf. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 
795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990) ("when reviewing a dismissal based upon rule 12, an 
appellate court must accept the material allegations of the complaint as true."). 
The Wills's notice of claim was not directed and delivered to the Attorney 
General. Accordingly, the Wills failed to strictly comply with the Immunity Act, and thus 
the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case and should have 
dismissed the litigation. 
II. THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
APPLIES TO ALL TO ALL GOVERNMENTAL 
ENTITIES. 
The Wills also argue that the Immunity Act is inapplicable because "an obligation 
of the [Railroad] does not constitute a debt or liability of this state . . . nor may any 
obligation or liability of the [Railroad] be payable from funds other than those of the 
authority." Utah Code Ann. § 9-3-307 (1992). The statute is inapposite here and the 
argument is irrelevant. The Railroad is a state authority, and the Immunity Act applies to 
ALL governmental entities. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-2(9); 63-30-3(1). In Hall this 
7 
Court stated that when suing a governmental entity, the claimant must comply with the 
Immunity Act. "[T]he codification of sovereign immunity mandates stringent 
enforcement, since it is through the Governmental Immunity Act that the 'legislature has 
recognized the necessity of immunity as essential to the protection of the state in 
rendering the many and ever increasing number of governmental services.'" Hall 2001 
UT 34, ^ [14, (quoting Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1976)). The fact that the 
Railroad may have independent authority and responsibility to "sue and be sued in its own 
name," "employ experts," "retain independent legal counsel" does not negate the 
application of the Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. § 9-3-306(2)(b), (f) and (g)(1992). As 
in Hall, the Immunity Act applies here and "where the government grants statutory rights 
of action against itself, any conditions placed on those rights must be followed precisely." 
Hall 2001UT 34.^24. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has consistently required all plaintiffs to strictly comply with the 
Immunity Act in order to proceed with litigation. Strict compliance with the Immunity 
Act is the standard, and the Wills have failed to meet it. As a result, the trial court lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear this suit and the litigation should have been dismissed. 
The Railroad cannot be estopped from raising this jurisdictional defense as it maybe 
raised at any time by either party and because the record is void of any representations 
made by the Attorney General upon which the Wills relied and which caused them to alter 
8 
their conduct in any manner. The Wills's failure to comply with the Immunity Act must 
result in the litigation's dismissal. 
DATED this H r f day of August, 2002. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
xhiA&iA s i <jkiuvfrt 
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT 
NANCY L. KEMP 
Assistant Utah Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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